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Ultracrepidarianism in Forensic 
Science: The Hair Evidence Debacle 
David H. Kaye* 
Abstract 
 
For over 130 years, scientific sleuths have inspected hairs 
under microscopes. Late in 2012, the FBI, the Innocence Project, 
and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers joined 
forces to review thousands of microscopic hair comparisons 
performed by FBI examiners over several of those decades. The 
results have been astounding. Based on the first few hundred 
cases in which hairs were said to match, it appears that examiners 
exceeded the limits of science in over 90% of their reports or 
testimony. The disclosure of this statistic has led to charges that 
the FBI faked an entire field of forensic science, placed 
pseudoscience in the witness box, and palmed off virtually 
worthless and scientifically indefensible evidence as scientific 
truth.  
This essay disputes these interpretations of the 90+% figure. 
Based on some of the scientific literature on hair comparisons, the 
public descriptions of the hair review project that have emerged, 
and some of the confessions of scientific error that the FBI has 
issued, it reaches three conclusions: (1) associating two hairs by 
their physical features can be slightly probative of whether they 
originated from the same source; (2) the hair review project does 
not bear on the validity of these associations or the quality of the 
examinations; rather, it is supposed to flag cases in which 
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examiners have overstated the power of a match to identify the 
source of the trace evidence; (3) some questionable determinations 
have been issued, and the 90+% figure may not be a valid and 
reliable measure of overclaiming.  
To promote a more complete understanding of the nature and 
extent of overclaiming, the review process should be made more 
transparent, and the materials it produces should be readily 
available for researchers and the public to study. New state or 
local evidence reviews should be designed with these concerns in 
mind. Finally, in all areas of forensic science, clear standards for 
presenting identification evidence without overclaiming should be 
devised, and training and monitoring programs should be 
implemented to ensure that laboratory personnel and prosecutors 
adhere to them. 
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I. Introduction 
Forensic-science practitioners commonly present findings 
regarding traces left at crime scenes, on victims or suspects, or on 
or in their possessions. Such trace evidence can take many forms. 
Physical traces such as fingerprints, striations on bullets, shoe 
and tire prints, and handwritten documents are common 
examples. Biological materials, such as blood, semen, saliva, and 
hairs also are fodder for the crime laboratory. Comparisons of a 
questioned and known sample can supply valuable information 
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on whether a specific suspect is associated in some manner with a 
crime.1 Viewers of the acronymious police procedurals—NCIS, 
CSI, and Law and Order SVU—know all of this.  
For decades, however, legal and other academics have 
questioned the hoary courtroom claims of absolutely certain 
identification of one and only one possible source of trace 
evidence.2 In the aftermath of the 2009 report of a National 
Research Council committee,3 these views have slowly gained 
traction in the forensic-science community. Indeed, in the popular 
press and among investigative reporters, the pendulum may be 
swinging in favor of uncritical rejection of once unquestioned 
forensic sciences. Recent months have seen an episode from 
Frontline presenting DNA evidence as “anything but proven”;4 
they have included unfounded reports that as many as 15% of 
men and women imprisoned with the help of DNA evidence at 
trial are wrongfully convicted;5 and award-winning journalists 
                                                                                                     
 1. Association is not necessarily causation. There may be innocent 
explanations for an impression or other trace that points to an individual. Thus, 
forensic scientists distinguish between “source level,” “activity level,” and 
“offense level” propositions. See COLIN G. G. AITKEN & FRANCO TARONI, 
STATISTICS AND THE EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE FOR FORENSIC SCIENTISTS 215–17 
(2d ed. 2004) (discussing the relationship between association and causation); cf. 
DAVID H. KAYE ET AL., THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: EXPERT 
EVIDENCE 601 (2d ed. 2011) (categorizing “hypotheses that might explain a 
reported match between samples said to be from the defendant and from a crime 
scene”). 
 2. See, e.g., David H. Kaye, Probability, Individualization, and 
Uniqueness in Forensic Science Evidence: Listening to the Academies, 75 BROOK. 
L. REV. 1163, 1164 n.10 (2010) (citing some of the critical literature); D. Michael 
Risinger & Michael J. Saks, A House with No Foundation, 20 ISSUES SCI. & 
TECH. 35 (2003) (arguing that many forensic techniques used in courtroom 
proceedings rest on weak science); D. Michael Risinger et al., Exorcism of 
Ignorance as a Proxy for Rational Knowledge: The Lessons of Handwriting 
Identification “Expertise”, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 731 (1989) (examining the 
importance and shortcomings of expert handwriting identification evidence). 
 3. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE 
FORENSIC SCI. CMTY., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: 
A PATH FORWARD 47 (2009). 
 4. Some inaccuracies in the documentary are noted in David H. Kaye, 
Frontline’s Expose of DNA Testing: Yes and No, FORENSIC SCI., STAT.& L. (June 
24, 2015), http://for-sci-law-now.blogspot.com/2015/06/frontlines-expose-of-dna-
testing-yes.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2015) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 5. See David H. Kaye, DNA Evidence Causes Wrongful Convictions 15% of 
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have spread the word that the FBI “faked an entire field of 
forensic science,”6 placed “pseudoscience in the witness box,”7 and 
palmed off “virtually worthless” evidence as scientific truth.8  
The last set of reports stem from an ongoing review of well 
over 20,000 cases in which the FBI issued reports on hair 
associations.9 The review spans decades of hair comparisons, and 
it is showing so many questionable statements that the expert 
evidence on hair associations stands out as “one of the country’s 
largest forensic scandals.”10 Its preliminary findings provoked 
prominent Senators to speak of an “appalling and 
chilling . . . indictment of our criminal justice system”11 and to 
                                                                                                     
the Time!?, FORENSIC SCI., STAT. & THE L. (July 3, 2015), http://for-sci-law-
now.blogspot.com/2015/07/dna-evidence-causes-wrongful.html (last visited Sept. 
24, 2015) (debunking this assertion of the Rand Corporation) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 6. Dahlia Lithwick, Pseudoscience in the Witness Box: The FBI Faked an 
Entire Field of Forensic Science, SLATE (Apr. 22, 2015, 5:09 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2015/04/fbi_s_fla
wed_forensics_expert_testimony_hair_analysis_bite_marks_fingerprints.html 
(last visited Sept. 22, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 7. Id. These “shameful, horrifying errors” comprised “a story so 
horrifying . . . that it would stop your breath.” Id. 
 8. Erin Blakemore, FBI Admits Pseudoscientific Hair Analysis Used in 
Hundreds of Cases: Nearly 3,000 Cases Included Testimony About Hair Matches, 
A Technique That Has Been Debunked, SMARTNEWS (Apr. 22, 2015), 
http://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/FBI-Admits-Pseudoscientific-Hair-
Analysis-Used-in-Hundreds-of-Cases-180955070/?no-ist (last visited Sept. 22, 
2015) (quoting Ed Pilkington, Thirty Years In Jail For A Single Hair: The FBI’s 
‘Mass Disaster’ of False Conviction, GUARDIAN (Apr. 21, 2015), 
http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/apr/21/fbi-jail-hair-mass-disaster-
false-conviction) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 9. Norman L. Reimer, Exec. Dir., Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers, 
Microscopic Hair Comparison Evidence Audit of 2013, Address at Texas 
Criminal Justice Integrity Unit and Texas Forensic Science Commission 
Meeting (July 11–12, 2013) (“The FBI has discovered over 21,000 cases so far in 
which FBI hair examiners issued a report. Of the first 11,000 cases reviewed, 
reports finding a positive association between a questioned hair and a suspect’s 
hair were discovered in approximately 1,650 cases.”). 
 10. Spencer S. Hsu, FBI Admits Flaws in Hair Analysis over Decades, 
WASH. POST (Apr. 18, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/fbi-
overstated-forensic-hair-matches-in-nearly-all-criminal-trials-for-
decades/2015/04/18/39c8d8c6-e515-11e4-b510-962fcfabc310_story.html (last 
visited Sept. 22, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 11. Id. (quoting Sen. Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.)). 
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call for a “root cause analysis”12 of ubiquitous errors. A distressed 
Department of Justice and FBI joined with the Innocence Project 
and the National Association of Defense Lawyers not only to 
publicize these failings but also to call on states “to conduct their 
own independent reviews where . . . examiners were trained by 
the FBI.”13 Projecting the outcome of cases that have yet to be 
reviewed, post-conviction petitions refer ominously to 
“[t]housands of . . . cases the Justice Department now recognizes 
were infected by false expert hair analysis”14 and 
“pseudoscientific nonsense.”15  
This Essay uses the hair scandal to differentiate two related 
problems with many types of forensic-science testimony. The first 
is the problem of foundation—what reasons are there to believe 
that hair or other analysts possess sufficient expertise to produce 
relevant evidence of associations between known and unknown 
samples? For years, commentators and some defense counsel 
have posed legitimate questions—with little impact in the 
courts—about the reliability and validity of physical comparisons 
by examiners asked to judge whether known and unknown 
samples are similar in enough respects—and not too dissimilar in 
other respects—to support a claim that they could have 
originated from the same individual.16 To paraphrase Gertrude 
                                                                                                     
 12. Id. (quoting S. Judiciary Comm. Chairman Charles E. Grassley (R-
Iowa) and Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.)). 
 13. Press Release, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, FBI Testimony on 
Microscopic Hair Analysis Contained Errors in at Least 90 Percent of Cases in 
Ongoing Review (Apr. 20, 2015), http://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-
releases/fbi-testimony-on-microscopic-hair-analysis-contained-errors-in-at-least-
90-percent-of-cases-in-ongoing-review. 
 14. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 2–3, Ferguson v. Steele, 134 S. Ct. 
1581 (2014). 
 15. Id. at 19. Justice Breyer views the “errors” referred to in the press 
release as emblematic of “flawed forensic testimony” generally and a reason to 
hold the death penalty unconstitutional. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 16. See, e.g., Simon A. Cole, Fingerprinting: The First Junk Science?, 28 
OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 73, 76 (2003) (arguing that fingerprint examination is not 
forensic science but rather “experience-based practice”); Robert Epstein, 
Fingerprints Meet Daubert: The Myth of Fingerprint “Science” Is Revealed, 75 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 605, 607 (2002) (arguing that “a ‘science of fingerprints’ [is] an 
unfounded creation of law enforcement fingerprint examiners”); Clive A. 
Stafford Smith & Patrick D. Goodman, Forensic Hair Comparison Analysis: 
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Stein, is there enough “there there” to warrant any form of 
testimony about a positive association?17 This is the existential 
question of whether “[t]he subject of an expert’s testimony [is] 
‘scientific . . . knowledge.’”18 Or, at the other extreme, is the entire 
enterprise ersatz—a “fake science” and a “worthless” endeavor? 
Part I of this Essay discusses this foundational question for 
physical hair comparisons. It rejects the harsh view that this 
endeavor is pure pseudoscience, like astrology, graphology, 
homeopathy, or metoposcopy, and argues that hair analysts 
generally possess some expertise in making associations.19  
The second problem lies in the presentation of perceived 
associations. Even if there is a there there, are forensic-science 
practitioners staying within the boundaries of their demonstrated 
expertise? Or are they purporting to know more than they do? 
Part II of Essay shows that the FBI’s revelations are limited to 
this issue of overclaiming. What the FBI has uncovered are 
expert assertions in one case after another that are said to 
outstrip the core of demonstrated knowledge. Such overclaiming 
is one form of scientifically invalid testimony,20 but it is not the 
                                                                                                     
Nineteenth Century Science or Twentieth Century Snake Oil?, 27 COLUM. HUM. 
RTS. L. REV. 227, 231 (1996) (“If the purveyors of this dubious science [forensic 
hair analysis] cannot do a better job of validating hair analysis than they have 
done so far, forensic hair comparison analysis should be excluded altogether 
from criminal trials.”); see sources cited supra note 2 (discussing flaws in claims 
that evidence can be definitive). 
 17. “What was the use of my having come from Oakland . . . there is no 
there there.” GERTRUDE STEIN, EVERYBODY’S AUTOBIOGRAPHY 289 (1937). 
 18. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589–90 (1993). 
 19. It does not attempt to resolve the legal question of whether this 
foundational evidence is enough to justify admission of findings of associations 
at trial under the rules governing expert evidence. For a short argument that 
hair evidence in inadmissible under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc., see 4 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND 
SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 30:48, at 78–79 (2014). The argument faces a 
veritable wall of contrary case law. See Meskimen v. Commonwealth, 435 
S.W.3d 526, 535–36 (Ky. 2013) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in admitting hair sample evidence); Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 30 
A.3d 1111, 1141 (Pa. 2011) (claiming that hair microscopy is an accepted and 
reliable scientific technique); PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, 
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 24.03, at 651–57 (4th ed. 2007) (reporting that most 
courts are receptive to hair analysis). 
 20. For this vocabulary, see generally Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. 
Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. 
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equivalent of an entire invalid science. In addition, Part II 
questions the uncritical use of the proportion of problematic cases 
identified by the FBI as an estimate of the prevalence of 
scientifically indefensible testimony.  
II. Matching Versus Guessing: Do Hair Examiners Have Anything 
to Offer? 
Contrary to the more breathless accounts, the testimony of 
hair examiners—including the mistaken judgments that have 
contributed to wrongful convictions—did not emanate from a 
worthless pseudoscience. As a means of making positive 
associations between samples, they have been largely superseded 
by (generally) more definitive and (always) less subjective 
mitochondrial DNA typing.21 Yet, mitotyping also proved that 
physical comparisons can be probative of identity. It is worth 
examining a few numbers to see how. In an intriguing study 
(usually cited as proof of the failings of microscopic hair 
comparisons),22 FBI researchers looked at human hairs submitted 
to the FBI laboratory for analysis between 1996 and 2000 in which 
examiners had first conducted microscopic comparisons and tried to 
mitotype them afterward.23 They counted the number of 
                                                                                                     
L. REV. 1 (2009). Cf. Eric S. Lander, Fix the Flaws in Forensic Science, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 21, 2015 (“The F.B.I. stunned the legal community on Monday with 
its acknowledgment that testimony by its forensic scientists about hair 
identification was scientifically indefensible in nearly every one of more than 
250 cases reviewed.”).  
 21. See DAVID H. KAYE, THE DOUBLE HELIX AND THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 226–
38 (2010). Mitotyping has not eliminated the need for physical comparisons. Id. 
Hair comparisons are still used to screen cases for mitotyping, and in some 
instances, hairs with similar physical features lack sufficient DNA for 
mitotyping. E.g., State v. Dotson, 450 S.W.3d 1, 36 (Tenn. 2014) (discussing 
DNA testing and its resulting evidence). In addition, mitotyping generally 
cannot distinguish between individuals who are maternally related.  
 22. E.g., Reimer, supra note 9; RICHARD SAFERSTEIN, FORENSIC SCIENCE: AN 
INTRODUCTION 418 (2d ed. 2011). 
 23. Max M. Houck & Bruce Budowle, Correlation of Microscopic and 
Mitochondrial DNA Hair Comparisons, 47 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1 (2002).  
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concordant and discordant results of the two procedures to obtain 
the figures shown in Table 1.24 
 
 Mitotyping + Mitotyping − 
Microscopy + 69 9 
Microscopy − 0 17 
Every time mitotyping indicated a positive association, so did 
the previous microscopic inspections.25 Thus, with mitotyping as 
the “gold standard,”26 the sensitivity of the microscopic analysis 
in the cases studied was 69/(69+0) = 100%. Of course, some of 
these concordances might have been lucky guesses or influenced 
by extraneous knowledge of other facts about the case, but if 
these cases are thought of as a random sample from a much 
larger population of hairs collected in criminal investigations, one 
could say that microscopic hair examiners confronted with truly 
matching hairs from this population will declare them to match 
at least 95% of the time.27  
For the 9 + 17 = 26 exclusions by mitotyping, the 
microanalysts reached the same conclusion as the DNA 
analysts—an exclusion—in seventeen cases, for a specificity of 
65% (with a confidence interval of 44% to 83%). To put it another 
way, the physical hair analysis produced nine false positive 
associations out of the twenty-six cases in which mitotyping 
                                                                                                     
 24. Table 1 is derived from id. at 3, Table 2. It omits all cases in which hair 
examiners or DNA analysts could not reach a conclusion as to association. 
 25. In another fifteen cases, the mitochondrial match was preceded by an 
inconclusive microscopic comparison. Mitotyping in an additional thirteen cases 
produced a match when no microscopic comparison had been conducted, 
presumably because the hair sample was too limited. Id. 
 26. In clinical medicine, a “gold standard” is the best single test (or a 
combination of tests) for diagnosing a disease. A validation study for another 
method measures performance against this the gold-standard test. E.g., 
Christopher D. Saudek et al., A New Look at Screening and Diagnosing Diabetes 
Mellitus, 93 J. CLINICAL ENDOCRINOLOGY & METABOLISM 2447 (2008). 
 27. The approximate 95% confidence intervals for the quantities given in 
the text were computed with MedCalc, 
https://www.medcalc.org/calc/diagnostic_test.php.  
Table 1. Comparison of Inclusions (+) and Exclusions (−) in Microscopic Hair 
Analyses with Those in Mitochondrial DNA Typing. 
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excluded the hairs and microscopic examinations had yielded 
either positive or negative associations (35%). However, there 
also were twenty cases of mitochondrial exclusions preceded by 
inconclusive microscopy. These were not false positive errors. 
Thus, it could be argued that the proportion of false positives was 
“only” 9/46 = 20%.28 Whichever denominator applies, the 9 false 
positives were cases in which microanalysis gave not only the 
wrong answer but an answer that could have contributed to a 
false conviction in the absence of confirmatory mitotyping.29  
This false positive rate is cause for concern—and a factor 
that cuts against admitting findings of an association at trial.30 
Still, in the bulk of the cases of same-source hairs, the procedure 
gave the correct answer. It is not as if the analysts were flipping 
coins, tossing oracle bones, or dealing Tarot cards. Those methods 
would be just as likely to produce a declared association when 
hairs really are associated as when they are not. In contrast, the 
probability of an FBI examiner finding of a positive association 
when comparing hairs from the same individual exceeded the 
probability of this finding when comparing hairs from different 
individuals by a factor of 100/35 = 2.9 (with a confidence interval 
of 1.7 to 4.9). Evidence like this is weakly diagnostic of an 
association.31  
                                                                                                     
 28. In another thirty-four cases, no microscopic comparisons were 
undertaken. Houck & Budowle, supra note 23, at 3, Table 2. 
 29. For still other statistics on the correlation between the microscopic and 
mitochondrial tests, see MAX HOUCK & JAY SIEGEL, FUNDAMENTALS OF FORENSIC 
SCIENCE 310 (3d ed. 2015). 
 30. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993) (“[T]he 
court ordinarily should consider the known or potential rate of error.”); Paul C. 
Giannelli, FBI Review of Microscopic Hair, 29 CRIM. JUST. 31, 31 (reporting on 
the FBI’s use of microscopic hair analysis). 
 31. By way of comparison, the positive likelihood ratio for the nitrite 
dipstick test and the Uriscreen test for urinary tract infection are .27/.06 = 4.5, 
and 1/.32 = 3.1, respectively. Anthony K. Akobeng, Understanding Diagnostic 
Tests 1: Sensitivity, Specificity and Predictive Values, 96 ACTA PÆDIATRICA 338, 
339 (2006). The ratio for the PSA test for prostate cancer is approximately .7/.1 
= 7. Carvell T. Nguyen & Michael W. Kattan, Prediction Models in Prostate 
Cancer Diagnosis, in PROSTATE CANCER DIAGNOSIS: PSA, BIOPSY AND BEYOND 85, 
86 (J. Stephen Jones ed., 2012). Such values are disappointing for a clinical test, 
and no clinician would want to rely on these tests alone. Nevertheless, the 
numbers mean that the tests have some diagnostic value. Courts have been 
impressed with even smaller relative risks in epidemiologic studies. See, e.g., In 
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A further indication that microscopic hair features have some 
value in separating same-source from different-source hairs 
comes from research published and debated in reputable journals 
since 1974. In that year, a Canadian forensic scientist32 and a 
professor of mathematical statistics33 described “An Attempt at 
Determining Probabilities in Human Scalp Hair Comparison.”34 
In essence, hair analysts coded many features of about 9 hairs 
from various points on each of 100 scalps.35 Out of the recorded 
                                                                                                     
re Actos (Pioglitazone) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 6:12–cv–00064–RFD–PJH, 2014 
WL 4364832 (W.D. La. Sept. 2, 2014) (treating a relative risk of less than three 
as helping establish a clinically significant hazard of bladder cancer from 
defendant’s drug). Even the sharpest critics of hair comparisons seem to regard 
them as useful for excluding suspects. E.g., Editorial, Junk Science at the F.B.I., 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2015, at A18 (discussing uses of hair comparison evidence). 
A method that reliably excludes even a fraction of possible suspects who are not 
the source increases the probability that an included suspect is the source. 
Thus, before more discerning DNA testing was available, courts recognized that 
even common blood types are admissible as evidence of identity. KAYE, supra 
note 21. If a hair has been shed from a person with type O blood (as established 
by a serologic test of the hair sheath), the positive likelihood ratio is about 2 (see 
LAURA DEAN, BLOOD GROUPS AND RED CELL ANTIGENS ch. 5 (2005), 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK2267/), which is comparable to that for a 
microscopic association. On the other hand, blood grouping results are unlikely 
to be influenced by knowledge of extraneous facts about the case. Hair 
comparisons could be influenced by examiner expectations from facts about guilt 
or innocence. If the examiners had access to this information, some of their 
success in reaching the same outcomes as the mitotyping could be a reflection of 
that knowledge, rather than their professed skill at matching just the features 
in the hairs. 
 32. Barry Douglas Gaudette (1947–2003) “served 33 years as a Forensic 
Scientist with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, most recently as Manager of 
the Canadian Police Research Centre, a collaboration of the National Research 
Council, Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Canadian Association of 
Chiefs of Police.” “DNA” 2003 Obituary, ONTARIO GENEALOGICAL SOC’Y 
PROVINCIAL INDEX (Oct. 4, 2003), 
https://www.ogs.on.ca/ogspi/2003/o2003dna.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2015) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 33. Professor E. S. Keeping was head of the Department of Mathematics at 
the University of Alberta from 1954 to 1961. WALTER HUGH JOHNS, A HISTORY OF 
THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA, 1908–1969 317 (1981). 
 34. Barry D. Gaudette & E. S. Keeping, An Attempt at Determining 
Probabilities in Human Scalp Hair Comparison, 19 J. FORENSIC SCI. 599 (1974). 
 35. See id. at 599 (stating that the actual number varied from six to eleven 
hairs selected to be representative of the variation seen in “80 to 100 hairs 
randomly selected from various regions of the scalp”).  
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feature sets of all the 366,630 pairs of these nearly 900 hairs from 
different individuals, only 9 matched.36 The probability of a false 
association for a single pair of hairs was therefore p = 9/366,630 = 
1/40,737. If nine hairs from a suspect who is not the source of the 
one questioned hair are compared with that one hair, the 
probability that at least one of the suspect’s hairs will match is no 
more than 9p = 9/40,737—which is a little less than 1/4500.37 
This particular number should not be regarded as a false-
positive error rate for actual forensic hair comparisons. As the 
literature discussing and extending this study reveals, applying 
this average probability to casework requires heroic 
assumptions.38 The hairs in the study may not have been 
representative of a population appropriate for casework, and the 
method used for matching those hairs differs from that in 
practice.39 For a witness to claim this level of accuracy in a given 
case or to assure a court that hair analysts are generally this 
accurate would amount to “misinformation.”40 Nevertheless, the 
“average probability”41 analysis helps demonstrate that the 
                                                                                                     
 36.  See id. at 602 (comparing 861 hairs, giving rise to 370,230 distinct 
pairs in total and to 370,230 − 3,600 = 366,630 pairs from different individuals). 
 37. THE EVOLVING ROLE OF STATISTICAL ASSESSMENTS AS EVIDENCE IN THE 
COURTS 65 (Stephen E. Fienberg ed., 1988) (applying the Bonferroni inequality). 
 38. Id. at 66; see Walter F. Rowe, The Current Status of Microscopical Hair 
Comparisons, 1 SCI. WORLD 868, 872–73 (2001) (reviewing the Gaudette-and-
Keeping study and the subsequent literature); Smith & Goodman, supra note 
16, at 246 (presenting concerns and modifying certain assumptions to obtain an 
average false-match probability of 1/261).  
 39. But see Houck & Budowle, supra note 23, at 2 (“[A] point-by-point, side-
by-side comparison of the microscopic characteristics in the known sample with 
those in the questioned hair [used in the FBI study] . . . is more reliable than a 
simple subjective determination of the properties of an object [used in the 
Gaudette-Keeping study].”). The FBI study also involved a second examiner’s 
verification, which should improve accuracy. 
 40. Fienberg, supra note 37, at 67; see also Colin G.G. Aitken & David A. 
Stoney, Introduction, in THE USE OF STATISTICS IN FORENSIC SCIENCE 23, 24 
(Colin G.G. Aitken & David A. Stoney eds., 1991) (“Average probabilities . . . 
have a place in the assessment of the worth of a general area of evidence, such 
as head hairs, where frequency data are unavailable. However, it is very 
misleading to quote average probabilities in the courts as a measure of the value 
of the evidence.”). 
 41. AITKEN & TARONI, supra note 1, at 133. 
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physical features of hair provide information on true 
associations.42 
Consequently, summarily to condemn the entire field as 
“junk science” from “so-called experts” that “would not make it 
within shouting distance of a peer-reviewed journal”43 is ill-
informed. That being said, there are significant legal arguments 
for excluding evidence of hair associations. Although microscopes 
are fine scientific instruments, and much is known about the 
biology of hair, the process of inferring an association is far from 
standardized. Hair examiners have always been clear that “[t]he 
conclusions drawn from a forensic hair comparison are subjective 
and result from an outgrowth of experience and judgment. 
Outside of personal observations acquired through the 
accumulated experiences of thousands of hair examinations, little 
data exists [sic] to aid the examiner in assessing the significance 
of a hair comparison.”44 
But “experiences” are not scientific observations,45 and true 
expertise does not develop without consistent feedback on 
                                                                                                     
 42. Id. at 229–31; see Colin G.G. Aitken, Populations and Samples, in 
Aitken & Stoney, supra note 40, at 51, 72 (“[T]he research of Gaudette & 
Keeping is valuable, and it showed that hair comparison can distinguish hairs 
from different sources.”); cf. A.J. Jeffreys et al., Individual-Specific ‘Fingerprints’ 
of Human DNA, 316 NATURE 76 (1985) (using a similar calculation to make 
extreme claims of individuality for multilocus DNA profiles). A few additional 
experiments into the accuracy of microscopic hair examinations, as well as an 
extension of the Gaudette-Keeping study, are summarized in Barry D. 
Gaudette, Evidential Value of Hair Examination, in FORENSIC EXAMINATION OF 
HAIR 243, 250–53 (James Robertson ed., 1999).  
 43. Editorial, supra note 31, at A18.   
 44. Richard E. Bisbing, The Forensic Identification and Association of 
Human Hair, in FORENSIC SCIENCE HANDBOOK 184, 210 (Richard Saferstein ed., 
1982). 
The merits of each comparison must be independently assessed before 
the strength of the conclusion is expressed. Factors such as the 
number of unknown hairs found to be similar to the controls, the 
number of microscopic features observed, the presence of unusual 
characteristics, the condition of the specimens, and the number and 
completeness of the exemplars must all be taken into account.  
Id.; see also Edward J. Imwinkelried, Forensic Hair Analysis: The Case Against 
Underemployment of Scientific Evidence, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 41, 62 (1982) 
(acknowledging the subjectivity of scientists when categorizing hair samples). 
 45. See Michael Baum, The Controlled Trial and the Advance of Reliable 
Knowledge, 287 BRIT. MED. J. 1216, 1216 (1983) (“The trouble with experience as 
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performance.46 As far as scientific research into hair comparisons 
goes, the average-probability studies indicate that trained 
examiners can code physical features that tend to differentiate 
hairs from different individuals. The FBI data on the correlation 
between mitotyping and microscopy indicate that, 
notwithstanding the absence of articulated standards for 
measurement and interpretation, analysts can make correct 
classifications at levels exceeding pure chance. However, the FBI 
data come from one small, retrospective study and the examiners 
may have had the benefit of extraneous information indicating 
whether the hairs would be expected to match or not. Are the 
publications enough to establish a reasonably accurate, generally 
applicable, and low enough error rate to warrant admission of the 
evidence? Are discrepancies between microscopy and mitotyping 
randomly distributed, or are there variables that make the 
perceived positive and negative morphological associations—the 
inclusions and exclusions—more accurate or less accurate in 
identifiable situations? Considering that the FBI has been 
combining microscopy with mitotyping for years, it should not be 
hard to replicate and extend the 2002 study to address some of 
these questions. Thus, the better argument against admissibility 
of all microscopic association evidence is not that hair morphology 
provides no meaningful information, but that more needs to be 
done to demonstrate and quantify the validity of the judgments of 
associations before accepting the risk that judges or juries will 
                                                                                                     
a way of approximating to reliable knowledge is that all of us tend to reinterpret 
each individual experience in the light of a previously held conceptual 
framework.”). 
 46. See KAYE ET AL., supra note 1, § 10.3.3  
Numerous studies have found that without quick and accurate 
feedback on correct and incorrect judgments, experience does not 
produce expertise and experts routinely overestimate their 
skills . . . . Casework in forensic handwriting analysis, latent 
fingerprint identification, toolmark identification, and other patterns 
and impression evidence comparisons rarely involve . . . feedback 
based on ground truth. The argument that the judgments of these 
analysts are valid merely because the practitioners have had 
specialized training or ample experience therefore is unimpressive. 
 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 227 (2015) 240
read too much into hair comparisons no matter how carefully 
they are presented.47  
Courts have almost always rejected this argument in favor of 
the view that hair evidence is not so falsely impressive that it 
should be kept from factfinders. No matter the outcome of this 
evidentiary question,48 the ongoing FBI review does not probe the 
scientific validity of the discipline; rather, it finds a pervasive 
problem with the overstated manner in which (weakly) probative 
evidence has been presented. But how clear is it that examiners 
are exceeding the limits of science nine times out ten? 
III. Association Versus Definitive Identification: How Do Hair 
Examiners Testify?  
There is reason to think that the FBI review project is 
casting a wide net in classifying reports and testimony as 
exceeding scientifically established limits of our knowledge about 
positive associations. Erring in the direction of being overly 
inclusive may be a reasonable strategy for notifying defense 
counsel of possible concerns, but it is sure to overestimate the 
prevalence of error in cases with hair evidence. Reviewers are not 
asking whether, on balance, reports and testimony are limited to 
a report of a positive association. Rather, they seem to be 
searching for any statements that, read in isolation and left 
unqualified, would suggest that an individual is the source of the 
hair in question.  
To indicate the resulting ambiguity in the statistic on 
scientifically erroneous testimony, this Part describes the broad 
criteria articulated by the FBI and its partners and then draws 
on Department of Justice letters to prosecutors and defense 
attorneys and on other sources for examples of laboratory 
                                                                                                     
 47. See Giannelli, supra note 30, at 32 (“[T]he evidence may have little 
probative value, while at the same time be quite misleading.”). The risk that 
jury will overvalue scientific evidence of limited accuracy is the raison d’être of 
the special scrutiny it should receive under cases such as Frye v. United States 
and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals. See generally KAYE ET AL., supra 
note 1 (discussing topics and issues surrounding admitting scientific evidence). 
 48. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (explaining this legal 
question in greater detail). 
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statements that have been deemed erroneous. It concludes that 
the high rate of reported errors includes an unknown number of 
contestable judgments. Unless the underlying reports and 
transcripts are made available for more rigorous research, an 
independent, scientifically credible evaluation of any statistics on 
the prevalence of errors and their significance is not feasible. 
A. The Hair Comparison Analysis Review Project 
In July 2012, the Department of Justice (DOJ) announced 
that it and the FBI had begun to identify “historical cases for 
review where a microscopic hair examination conducted by the 
FBI was among the evidence in a case that resulted in a 
conviction.”49 But “details of how the new FBI review will be 
conducted [were] unclear.”50  
Over the next year, the Department and the Bureau “worked 
closely” with the Innocence Project (IP), the National Association 
of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL), and pro bono lawyers “in 
determining the scope, protocols and implementation of [a] 
review [of] more than 2,000 cases that were processed by the FBI 
[before] 2000.”51 The most complete published explication of the 
protocol for determining whether statements “were scientifically 
invalid”52 or exceeded “the permissible limits of the science of hair 
microscopy”53 comes from the NACDL.54 This article explains that 
                                                                                                     
 49. Spencer S. Hsu, Justice Dept., FBI to Review Use of Forensic Evidence 
in Thousands of Cases, WASH. POST (July 10, 2012), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/justice-dept-fbi-to-review-use-of-
forensic-evidence-in-thousands-of-cases/2012/07/10/gJQAT6DlbW_story.html 
(last visited Sept. 3, 2015) (quoting Department of Justice spokeswoman Nanda 
Chitre) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Innocence Project and NACDL Announce Historic Partnership with the 
FBI and Department of Justice on Microscopic Hair Analysis Cases, INNOCENCE 
PROJECT (July 18, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.innocenceproject.org/news-
events-exonerations/press-releases/innocence-project-and-nacdl-announce-
historic-partnership-with-the-fbi-and-department-of-justice-on-microscopic-hair-
analysis-cases (last visited Sept. 3, 2015) [hereinafter Innocence Project] (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Norman L. Reimer, The Hair Microscopy Review Project: An Historic 
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the reviewers look for “three types of error.”55 A “Type I” error 
occurs when an “examiner stated or implied that the evidentiary 
hair could be associated with a specific individual to the exclusion 
of all others.”56 How the reviewer decides what is implied is 
entirely undefined.57 A Type II error exists when an  
examiner assigned to the positive association a statistical 
weight or probability or provided a likelihood that the 
questioned hair originated from a particular source, or an 
opinion as to the likelihood or rareness of the positive 
association that could lead the jury to believe that valid 
statistical weight can be assigned to a microscopic hair 
association.58 
Finally, a Type III error arises when an “examiner cites the 
number of cases or hair analyses worked in the lab and the 
                                                                                                     
Breakthrough For Law Enforcement and a Daunting Challenge for the Defense 
Bar, CHAMPION (July 2013), http://www.nacdl.org/Champion.aspx?id=29488 (last 
visited Sept. 3, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 54. See id. (explaining that after reviewing the case materials, the FBI will 
send its determination to the IP and NACDL for their review, with the aim of 
notifying defense counsel or the defendant of erroneous statements).  
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. (emphasis added). 
 57. Illustrating a Type I error, the article offers an easy hypothetical 
example: 
I found brown, Caucasian head hairs on two items of clothing, the 
sports coat, and a pair of slacks that were reported to me as belonging 
to [the defendant]. Now, these hairs matched in every observable 
microscopic characteristic to that known hair sample of DEC [the 
decedent] and consistent with having originated from her. In my 
opinion, based on my experience in the laboratory and having done 
16,000 hair examinations, my opinion is that those hairs came from 
DEC. 
Id. 
 58. Id. (emphasis added). The accompanying example is as follows: 
Q: Now, based on your training and experience and your expertise in 
the field, and based on your knowledge of hair transfer and hair 
comparison, and based on the work done in this case, do you have an 
opinion, within the degree of scientific certainty, as to whether or not 
the pubic hair found in the underpants of [victim] came from 
[defendant]? 
A: I would say that it would be a very high degree of probability that 
it does. Or to reverse it, I would say the chances of it being from 
somebody else, other than Mr. XX, would be highly unlikely at best. 
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number of samples from different individuals that could not be 
distinguished from one another as a predictive value to bolster 
the conclusion that a hair belongs to a specific individual.”59 
Soon after entering into this unprecedented agreement, the 
FBI halted its review, allegedly because “[n]early every criminal 
case reviewed . . . included flawed forensic testimony.”60 The FBI 
attributed the hiatus to “a vigorous debate that occurred within 
the FBI and DOJ about the appropriate scientific standards we 
should apply when reviewing FBI lab examiner testimony—many 
years after the fact.”61 Apparently, the FBI lost the debate. The 
Deputy Attorney General ordered the Bureau to proceed “under 
the original terms.”62  
That was late in July of 2013. On April 20, 2015, the FBI 
issued a stunning press release acknowledging that “examiners’ 
testimony in at least 90 percent of [268] trial transcripts the 
Bureau analyzed as part of its Microscopic Hair Comparison 
Analysis Review contained erroneous statements.”63 The 
                                                                                                     
 59. Id. (emphasis added). The example is: “Now over the last 12 years, I 
personally have looked at hairs from about 10,000 different people, and over 
that time, I’ve only had two occasions out of the 10,000 people where I had hairs 
from two different people that I could not separate them.” Id.  
 60. See Spencer S. Hsu, Federal Review Stalled After Finding Forensic 
Errors by FBI Lab Unit Spanned Two Decades, WASH. POST (July 29, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/federal-review-stalled-after-finding-
forensic-errors-by-fbi-lab-unit-spanned-two-decades/2014/07/29/04ede880-11ee-
11e4-9285-4243a40ddc97_story.html (last visited Sept. 2, 2015) (reviewing some 
160 cases) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 61. See id. (“‘Working closely with DOJ, we have resolved those issues and 
are moving forward with the transcript review for the remaining cases,’ the FBI 
said.”).  
 62. Id. 
 63. FBI, supra note 13. The press release explains: 
The government identified nearly 3,000 cases in which FBI 
examiners may have submitted reports or testified in trials using 
microscopic hair analysis. As of March 2015, the FBI had reviewed 
approximately 500 cases. The majority of these cases were trials and 
the transcript of examiner testimony was reviewed. Some of these 
cases ended in guilty pleas, limiting the review to the original lab 
report. In the 268 cases where examiners provided testimony used to 
inculpate a defendant at trial, erroneous statements were made in 
257 (ninety-six percent) of the cases. 
See also Hsu, supra note 10 (noting that a less-detailed report of these results 
came from the DOJ, FBI, IP, and NACDL the day before). 
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disclosure ignited the media firestorm about “fairytale hair 
evidence,”64 a “discredited tool,”65 and an “elite FBI forensic 
unit”66 that was “wrong in 96 pct. of cases.”67 
Yet, it is not so easy to know what to make of the 90+ percent 
figure. Clearly, it does not mean that FBI analysts were wrong to 
report and testify to—in some manner—a positive association in 
the 268 cases of testimony for the prosecution.68 Although there 
undoubtedly are cases in which FBI analysts announced that 
questioned and known hairs could have come from the same 
source when, in fact, the hairs came from different sources,69 
determining “ground truth” in the thousands of cases is all but 
impossible. In any event, this task is not part of the review. The 
issue before the reviewers is not the scientific validity of hair 
comparison as such—although, as noted in Part I, that is indeed 
open to question. The issue is not whether the specific judgments 
                                                                                                     
 64. Sean Allocca, In the Public Eye: FBI’s Fairytale Hair Evidence and the 
Real-Life Consequences, FORENSIC MAG. (July 7, 2015, 10:03 AM), 
http://www.forensicmag.com/videos/2015/07/public-eye-fbis-fairytale-hair-
evidence-and-real-life-
consequences?et_cid=4663527&et_rid=454869145&location=top (last visited 
Sept. 4, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 65. Joseph A. Slobodzian, Hair Analysis a Discredited Tool: FBI Review 
Shows It Was Wrong in 96 Pct. of Cases, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, May 12, 2015, 
at A1. 
 66. Hsu, supra note 10. 
 67. Slobodzian, supra note 65.  
 68. See FBI/DOJ Microscopic Hair Comparison Analysis Review, FBI, 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/scientific-analysis/fbi-doj-microscopic-hair-
comparison-analysis-review (last visited July 5, 2015) (outlining that the FBI 
continues to refer to visual and microscopic comparisons as perfectly capable of 
yielding “probative associations” and emphasizes that “microscopic hair 
comparison analysis is a valid scientific technique still conducted by the FBI 
Laboratory”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 69. See Spencer S. Hsu, Kirk Odom, Who Served 20 Years for 1981 D.C. 
Rape, Is Innocent, Prosecutors Say, WASH. POST (July 10, 2012), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/2012/07/10/gJQAUjZNbW_story.ht
ml (last visited Sept. 4, 2015) (acknowledging scientific errors after DNA 
evidence proved another man was the culprit) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review); David H. Kaye, The FBI's Worst Hair Days, FORENSIC SCI., 
STAT. & L. (July 31, 2014), http://for-sci-law-now.blogspot.com/2014/07/the-fbis-
worst-hair-days.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2015) (discussing the prosecution’s 
overstated presentations of microscopic hair associations in two cases) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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in the cases were gross departures from the norm for ascertaining 
when samples could have originated from a common source. It is 
not whether claims of a positive association are, ipso facto, 
scientifically unacceptable and therefore should not have been 
made.  
To the contrary, the NACDL and the IP 
agreed with the FBI that an examiner’s testimony concerning 
the relationship between two hairs is appropriate [to show] 
that a contributor of a known sample could be included in a 
pool of people of unknown size, as a possible source of the hair 
evidence (without in any way giving probabilities, as an 
opinion to the likelihood or rareness of the positive association, 
or the size of the class) . . . .70  
The IP further explained  
[I]t is possible to conduct hair microscopy and find similarities 
among various samples. But it appears that in many cases the 
FBI analysts were overstating the significance of these 
similarities, often leaving juries with the false impression that 
a hair recovered from the crime scene must have come from 
the defendant and could not have come from anyone else.71  
In sum, the only issue in the review is whether the 
examiners were claiming or implying substantially more than a 
“possible source” association. “Possible source” testimony is the 
kind that hair examiners have always said they could 
legitimately provide. The professional literature has long 
acknowledged that microscopic characteristics are not useful for 
“absolute personal identification”, but only for “determining 
whether or not a questioned hair could have originated from a 
particular individual.”72 Experts have testified accordingly.73 
                                                                                                     
 70. Reimer, supra note 53. 
 71. Innocence Project, supra note 51 (quoting Peter Neufeld, co-founder and 
co-director). Of course, this concession may have been a strategic one, rather 
than a full-throated endorsement of microscopic comparisons. 
 72. See Douglas W. Deedrick & Sandra L. Koch, Microscopy of Hair Part 1: 
A Practical Guide and Manual for Human Hairs, FORENSIC SCI. COMM. (Jan. 
2004), https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/forensic-science-
communications/fsc/jan2004/research/2004_01_research01b.htm (last visited 
Sept. 4, 2014) (“The variability and distribution of the microscopic 
characteristics are useful in determining whether or not a questioned hair could 
have originated from a particular individual [but] hair comparisons do not 
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Given the cautions in the professional literature, what is 
shocking is that so many examiners so often went beyond the 
limits of the knowledge that their discipline claimed.  
But how often did this occur? The FBI Hair Comparison 
Review does not seek to provide a precise and scientifically 
defensible estimate of the prevalence of ultracrepidarian 
testimony. The purpose of the exercise is to notify defendants 
whose conviction might be tainted by overstated testimony, along 
with the prosecutors, so that they can pursue any appropriate 
                                                                                                     
constitute a basis for absolute personal identification.”) (emphasis added) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); JOHN W. HICKS, MICROSCOPY OF 
HAIR: A PRACTICAL GUIDE AND MANUAL 7 (1977)  
[T]he examiner may conclude (1) that the hairs are consistent or 
similar and could have come from the same source, (2) that the hairs 
are dissimilar and did not come from the same source or (3) that the 
hairs possess characteristics which are not sufficiently defined to 
arrive at a meaningful conclusion.;  
id. at 4 (“[T]he possibility cannot be dismissed that there may be two hair 
samples whose ranges of variation overlap and, therefore, a positive 
identification cannot be made.”); id. at 41 (“[H]airs do not possess a sufficient 
number of unique individual microscopic characteristics to be positively 
identified as having originated from a particular person to the exclusion of all 
others.”); Houck & Budowle, supra note 23, at 2 (“Microscopic comparison of 
hairs has never been considered a positive form of identification.”); NAT. RES. 
COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 156 (“[A] conclusion of a ‘match’ means only that the 
hair could have come from any person whose hair exhibited—within some levels 
of measurement uncertainties—the same microscopic characteristics, but it 
cannot uniquely identify one person.”); Forensic Human Hair Examination 
Guidelines, FORENSIC SCI. COMM. (Apr. 2005), http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/lab/forensic-science-
communications/fsc/april2005/index.htm/standards/2005_04_standards02.htm 
(last visited Sept. 3, 2015) (“Individualization is the process of attempting to 
determine whether a given hair came from one particular (person) source to the 
exclusion of all other sources. This is not possible with forensic microscopical 
hair comparison.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). But see 
Bisbing, supra note 44, at 203 (allowing for the possibility of “individuality . . . 
only under extremely unusual circumstances”). 
 73. See, e.g., State v. Cameron, 674 P.2d 651, 655 (Wash. 1983) (“[T]he 
expert stated only that the hair ‘could have originated from this individual.’”). 
But see Tani Watkins et al., The Science of Forensic Hair Comparisons and the 
Admissibility of Hair Comparison Evidence: Frye and Daubert Considered, 
MCCRONE GROUP (Mar. 2, 2004), https://www.mccrone.com/mm/the-science-of-
forensic-hair-comparisons-and-the-admissibility-of-hair-comparison-evidence-
frye-and-daubert-considered/ (last visited Sept. 4, 2015) (“Most experts testify 
that the likelihood of finding someone else with indistinguishable hair is remote, 
a rare event.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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relief. That is a laudable purpose, but it does not demand 
scientific precision. It is better to be overinclusive than 
underinclusive in screening for cases of possible injustice. The 
Hair Comparison Analysis Review is a massive effort to spot all 
cases with statements that should not have been made. As we 
soon shall see, the reviewers are not evaluating the nature of the 
testimony as a whole by considering whether potentially 
misleading statements were corrected or explained appropriately, 
and the reviewers could be using contestable criteria for 
classifying individual statements as erroneous. 
B. How Are the Reviewers Classifying Statements? 
A White House task force to protect students from sexual 
assault began its report with a statistic designed to underscore 
the seriousness of the problem: “One in five women is sexually 
assaulted in college.”74 But other estimates are “all over the 
map . . . ,”75 in part because of variations in the definitions of 
sexual assault and the wording of the specific survey questions 
that operationalize these definitions.76 To convey the campus 
meaning of “sexual assault,” some colleges supply explicit 
examples to cover “the full range of nonconsensual sexual 
activity.”77 
Just as one cannot make sense of statistics on the prevalence 
of campus sexual assault without knowing the details of how the 
estimates were obtained, one cannot conclude that 90% or more is 
a sound estimate of overclaiming without knowing the specifics 
                                                                                                     
 74. THE WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE TO PROTECT STUDENTS FROM SEXUAL 
ASSAULT, NOT ALONE: THE FIRST REPORT OF THE WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE TO 
PROTECT STUDENTS FROM SEXUAL ASSAULT 2 (2014). 
 75. Joanne Lipman, The Toughest Issue on (Any) Campus, YALE ALUMNI 
MAG., July–Aug. 2015, at 41; see also Sofi Sinozich & Lynn Langton, Bureau of 
Justice Statistics, Rape and Sexual Assault Victimization Among College-Age 
Females, 1995–2013, Dec. 2014, at 2 (detailing the National Crime 
Victimization Study’s findings that the victimization rate was an order of 
magnitude less (4.7 per 1,000 for females ages 18 to 24 enrolled in post-
secondary schools)).  
 76. Sinozich & Langton, supra note 75, at 41. 
 77. Id. 
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about statements that the FBI classifies as Type I, II, and III 
errors. The generic definitions are hardly self-applying, and the 
hypothetical examples from the NACDL do not span the kinds of 
testimony that actually occur.  
To appreciate the problem, it may be helpful to consider the 
reports or testimony in a few cases in which the FBI has 
confessed error. Ambiguities in the definitions would be academic 
if all cases were clear, but the life of the law is more complicated. 
The outcome for some cases is obvious enough; for instance, in 
one Florida case, the examiner testified that “[i]t’s highly unlikely 
that the pubic hair originated from anybody else than Mr. Grady, 
and it’s highly unlikely that the head hair originated from 
anybody else . . . the chances of that would be almost 
nonexistent.”78 This is a clear “Error Type I”—an express or 
implied assertion “that the evidentiary hair could be associated 
with a specific individual to the exclusion of all others.”  
A slightly less-obvious example comes from a wrongful 
conviction case in the District of Columbia that helped precipitate 
the FBI’s review project, where an analyst “said . . . the hair in 
the stocking came from Tribble.”79 Such testimony is a source 
attribution, but it is not clear from this description whether the 
analyst identified Tribble “to the exclusion of all others.” This 
phrase was extremely popular among analysts of impression and 
patterns (like fingerprints and tool marks) who believed that 
their discipline studies characteristics that can exist in their 
particulars in only one object in the universe. Of course, the 
words “to the exclusion” are logically redundant.80 If the analyst 
believed that “the hair . . . came from Tribble,” then he must have 
believed that it did not come from anyone else. However, one 
reasonably can believe that a named individual is the source of a 
                                                                                                     
 78. Reimer, supra note 9 (displaying transcript of Michael Malone’s direct 
testimony). 
 79. Maurice Possley, Santae Tribble, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS 
(July 21, 2014), 
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=392
6 (last visited Sept. 11, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 80. See generally Simon Cole, Individualization Is Dead, Long Live 
Individualization! Reforms of Reporting Practices for Fingerprint Analysis in the 
United States, 13 L., PROBABILITY & RISK 117 (2014). 
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trace—because that is the most likely conclusion—without 
believing it is impossible for anyone else to have been the source 
(which is most likely what “to the exclusion” was supposed to 
mean).81 Thus, there is an ambiguity in the meaning of “Error 
Type I.” How explicit and firm must the analyst be in excluding 
all other individuals as possible contributors of the hair?82  
Now consider United States v. MacDonald,83 one of the most 
storied cases in the annals of crime.84 There, an examiner 
testified that “this hair—in conducting a comparison examination 
with the comparison microscope—microscopically matched the 
head hairs of Colette MacDonald.”85 This statement was not 
deemed erroneous, since it made no assertion beyond the bare 
fact that the questioned and known hairs matched. But upon 
being asked on cross-examination why he was not concerned 
about the fact that the questioned hair was entangled with a 
thread, the examiner explained that he was examining it only to 
reach a “conclusion” about “its origin.”86 How it had been stored 
was irrelevant to that question. The FBI, the NCDL, and the IP 
                                                                                                     
 81. See Kaye, supra note 5 (discussing the meaning of individualization 
and uniqueness in forensic science). 
 82. One case indicates that “to the exclusion of all others” is not a 
limitation at all. In one of two double-murder charges for which Willie Manning 
was convicted, an FBI agent testified that normally he could make a source 
attribution “to some degree of certainty.” Manning v. State, 726 So.2d 1152, 
1180 (Miss. 1998). In this case, he did not do so; rather, he said that because the 
hairs recovered from a car “were only fragments,” he could make no comparison 
and “was limited to a determination as to the racial characteristics of the hair.” 
Manning v. Epps, 695 F. Supp. 2d 323, 380 (N.D. Miss. 2009). The Department 
of Justice issued a confession-of-scientific-error letter anyway. David Kaye, 
Justice Breyer in Glossip v. Gross on “Flawed Testimony from an FBI Hair 
Examiner,” FORENSIC SCI., STAT. & L. (July 16, 2015), http://for-sci-law-
now.blogspot.com/2015/07/justice-breyer-in-glossip-v-gross-on.html (last visited 
Sept. 11, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 83. Nos. 3:75–CR–00026–F, 5:06–CV–00024–F, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
64572 (E.D.N.C. May 18, 2015). 
 84. See generally David H. Kaye, No Relief for Jeffrey MacDonald After FBI 
Declares It “Exceeded the Limits of Science” with Hair Analysis, FORENSIC SCI., 
STAT. & L. (May 23, 2015), http://for-sci-law-now.blogspot.com/2015/05/no-relief-
for-jeffrey-macdonald-after.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2015) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 85. Id. (quoting testimony of Paul Stombaugh). 
 86. MacDonald, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64572, at *6; see also Kaye, supra 
note 84 (detailing the cross-examination and testimony with further specificity). 
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all classified the exchange as a Type I error—an express or 
implied assertion “that the evidentiary hair could be associated 
with a specific individual to the exclusion of all others.” Never 
mind that the examiner had not testified that the hair originated 
from Colette MacDonald or anyone else. In this instance, the 
reviewers’ judgment that this examiner made a source attribution 
of any kind seems questionable. 
Moving to some examples of Type II errors, an examiner in 
an Arkansas case testified “it is possible for two different people’s 
hair to exhibit the same uniqueness, but it’s very rare. . . . [I]t 
would be a very low degree of probability of it happening.”87 This 
statement does not seem to supply a statistical weight or 
probability, but it unequivocally expresses “an opinion as to the 
likelihood or rareness of the positive association.” As such, it 
clearly exemplifies one category of a Type II error.88 Compare this 
with the report in MacDonald stating that “[a] forcibly removed 
Caucasian head hair . . . exhibits the same microscopic 
characteristics as hairs in the K2 specimen. Accordingly, this hair 
is consistent with having originated from Kimberly MacDonald, 
the identified source of the K2 specimen.”89  
This, the FBI concluded, was also a Type II error. But why? 
Again, the examiner had not “assigned to the positive association 
a statistical weight or probability.”90 Additionally, he had not 
“provided a likelihood that the questioned hair originated from a 
particular source . . . ,”91 nor had he expressed an “opinion as to 
the likelihood or rareness of the positive association.”92 
Apparently, examiners can say that two hairs share the same 
                                                                                                     
 87. See Reimer, supra note 9 (displaying an excerpt from the transcript in 
Arkansas v. Spencer). 
 88. See also Duckett v. State, 568 So.2d 891, 893 (Fla. 1990) (“While other 
experts could not reach a conclusion by comparing that hair with Duckett’s 
pubic hair, Michael Malone, an FBI special agent [concluded] that there was a 
high degree of probability that the pubic hair found in her underpants was 
Duckett’s pubic hair.”). 
 89. United States v. MacDonald, Nos. 3:75–CR–00026–F, 5:06–CV–00024–
F, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64572, at *14 (E.D.N.C. May 18, 2015). 
 90. Reimer, supra note 53. 
 91. MacDonald, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64572, at *5. 
 92. But cf. supra note 57 and accompanying text (contrasting this example 
with a traditional Type II error). 
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features—they “match,” or they are “consistent with” one 
another—but must not add the obvious (and scientifically 
undeniable) fact that this observation (if correct) means that the 
hairs could have had the same origin or that they are “consistent 
with” this possibility.93 And even if they add that “[h]air 
comparisons are not a basis for personal identification,” as this 
examiner did, they have, in the FBI’s view, “exceeded the limits of 
science.”94 
Of course, one can criticize phrases like “consistent with” and 
“match” as creating an unacceptable risk that—in the absence of 
clarification on direct examination, cross-examination, or by 
judicial instruction—jurors will think the words connote a source 
attribution. But this would make their use a Type I error, which 
does not seem to be the FBI’s position.95 More importantly, 
arguments of this sort stray from determinations that an 
examiner has made statements that “exceed the limits of science” 
to judgments that an examiner has made statements that are 
scientifically acceptable but prone to being misunderstood.  
To be sure, this latter danger is important to the law. As 
noted in Part I, it should inform rulings of admissibility under 
Federal Rules of Evidence 403 and 702. It is a reason to regulate 
the manner in which experts testify to scientifically acceptable 
findings, as some courts have done.96 Laboratories themselves 
                                                                                                     
 93. Although a statement that two hairs with matching features are 
“consistent with” the hypothesis of a common origin seems well within the 
bounds of science, the phrase—and various related ones—are far from ideal. See 
I. W. Evett et al., The Impact of the Principles of Evidence Interpretation on the 
Structure and Content of Statements, 40 SCI. & JUST. 233, 237 (2000) (explaining 
why the given phrase tends to “obscure” rather than clarify).  
 94. Id. (quoting the Department of Justice letter in the case).  
 95. One might argue that it is poor science to consider consistency with 
only the prosecution’s same-source hypothesis and not the defense’s different-
source hypothesis. An expert who wants to use “consistent with” terminology 
might testify that (1) the match is consistent with both hypotheses, but (2) it 
lends more support to the former as compared to the latter, and (3) there is 
currently no adequate basis indicating how much more support it provides for 
the same-source hypothesis. This comparative statement about the weight of the 
evidence seems scientifically justified. If it were not, the relevance of any 
testimony of matching features would be in doubt. 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 
195, at 996–97 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 7th ed. 2013). 
 96. See generally KAYE ET AL., supra note 1 (discussing the admission of 
scientific evidence) 
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should adopt and enforce policies to ensure that reports and 
testimony avoid terminology that is known to convey the wrong 
impression. But it is misleading to include scientifically 
acceptable, but psychologically dangerous, phrasing in the counts 
of scientifically erroneous statements. Case-review projects ought 
to flag all instances in which examiners have not presented their 
findings as they should have, but reports ought to differentiate 
between statements that directly “exceed the limits of science” 
and those that risk being misconstrued in a way that would make 
them “exceed the limits of science.” One size does not fit all. 
IV. Conclusion 
For over 130 years, scientific sleuths have been inspecting 
hairs under microscopes to ascertain whether particular hairs 
could have come from the same person.97 This branch of forensic 
science can supply evidence that is weakly probative of identity.98 
The Microscopic Hair Comparison Analysis Review initiated in 
2012 does not alter this conclusion. Instead, the Review 
presupposes that there is a scientific basis for some testimony but 
that FBI examiners have been known to exceed what this 
foundation supports. Despite the legitimate challenges that can 
be raised to the rather standardless nature of microscopic hair 
associations, claims that the case review project has shown them 
to be a mere pseudoscience that produces wrong answers over 
90% of the time rest on a misunderstanding of the nature of the 
review.  
Of course, as a screening test for overclaiming, the review 
project need not meet the publication standards that social 
science would demand for a valid and reliable application of the 
taxonomy of errors that the FBI and its partners created. 
Undertaking that kind of study would not be trivial. It would 
require a detailed and relatively unambiguous protocol to guide 
                                                                                                     
 97. See Imwinkelried, supra note 44, at 41 (“This year [1982] marks the one 
hundredth anniversary of the use of scientific hair evidence in American 
Prosecutions.”). 
 98. See generally supra Part I. 
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the reviewers in their determinations.99 It would include some 
demonstration that the reviewers were applying the guidelines 
reliably. And it would entail creating a dataset of reports and 
transcripts for inspection by other researchers. Ironically, while 
the State Department is releasing thousands of pages of Hillary 
Clinton’s emails,100 the reports and transcripts held by the 
Justice Department are not readily available for independent 
scrutiny. 
Nevertheless, the ongoing Hair Analysis Comparison Review 
already has delivered a crucial lesson to the forensic science 
community and the criminal justice system. It seems likely—and 
it is deplorable—that many hair examiners have overstated the 
probative value of their findings of positive associations—and not 
just in the rare and exceptional case. Although just how flagrant 
all the overstatements have been is unclear and no precise 
estimate of the prevalence of overclaiming is available, there is no 
reason to wait for an exact statistic or for more nuanced 
measures. Steps can and should be taken in all jurisdictions and 
all areas of forensic science to reduce the incidence of 
overclaiming. The Organization of Scientific Area Committees 
needs to develop clear standards for the limits on testimony about 
hair and other forms of scientific identification evidence.101 
Laboratories need to implement or maintain training and 
continuing education programs designed to ensure that: analysts 
                                                                                                     
 99. After this Essay was in press, the FBI responded affirmatively to a 
Freedom of Information Act request for written instructions received by its 
examiners. I plan to discuss this internal guidance document in later 
publications on the presentation of trace evidence.  
 100. See Polly Mosendz, State Department Releases 7,000 Pages of Hillary 
Clinton’s Emails, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 31, 2015, 9:04 PM), 
http://www.newsweek.com/state-department-releases-7000-pages-hillary-
clintons-email-367458 (last visited Sept. 22, 2015) (discussing the State 
Department’s release of 7,000 of Clinton’s emails) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review).   
 101. Nat’l Institute of Standards and Technology, ORG. OF SCI. AREA COMMS. 
(OSAC) (Feb. 7, 2014), http://www.nist.gov/forensics/osac.cfm (last visited Sept. 
22, 2015) (“NIST is working with the forensic science community to establish 
the new Organization for Scientific Area Committees (OSAC). OSAC will 
coordinate development of standards and guidelines for the forensic science 
community to improve quality and consistency of work in the forensic science 
community.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 227 (2015) 254
(1) understand what has been scientifically established in their 
field; (2) appreciate that impressions of accurate judgments on 
their part or on the part of their colleagues are not acceptable 
measures of validity or strength of evidence; and (3) know how to 
provide answers at trial that reflect these understandings even 
when pressed to make stronger claims. Testimony should be 
monitored so that expert witnesses receive feedback when they 
approach or cross a clear line established by the laboratory for 
testimony. Parallel training and monitoring programs for 
prosecutors should ensure that they (1) do not make arguments 
that overstate the scientifically established power of the evidence; 
and (2) do not frame questions that invite the witness do so, 
directly or by implication.102 Finally, as the shock brought on by 
the 90%+ statistic triggers statewide hair testimony (or other) 
review programs, the different types of overclaiming can be 
defined more precisely, and appropriate examples from the 
federal review can be employed in new instructions to reviewers. 
In these ways, the hair evidence debacle can be transformed from 
a source of cynicism to a force for maturation. 
 
                                                                                                     
 102. Judicial orders also can be framed to preclude overclaiming, and jury 
instructions can be issued to correct transgressions. 
